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We report the case of an individual with acquired prosopagnosia who experiences
extreme difficulties in recognizing familiar faces in everyday life despite excellent
object recognition skills. Formal testing indicates that he is also severely impaired at
remembering pre-experimentally unfamiliar faces and that he takes an extremely long
time to identify famous faces and to match unfamiliar faces. Nevertheless, he performs
as accurately and quickly as controls at identifying inverted familiar and unfamiliar
faces and can recognize famous faces from their external features. He also performs
as accurately as controls at recognizing famous faces when fracturing conceals the
configural information in the face. He shows evidence of impaired global processing
but normal local processing of Navon figures. This case appears to reflect the clearest
example yet of an acquired prosopagnosic patient whose familiar face recognition deficit
is caused by a severe configural processing deficit in the absence of any problems in
featural processing. These preserved featural skills together with apparently intact visual
imagery for faces allow him to identify a surprisingly large number of famous faces when
unlimited time is available. The theoretical implications of this pattern of performance for
understanding the nature of acquired prosopagnosia are discussed.
Keywords: face-recognition, FRUs, Navon, mental-imagery, prosopagnosia, featural processing, holistic
processing, configural processing
Introduction
Several acquired prosopagnosic patients have been reported with severe difficulties in identifying
faces despite being able to recognize other classes of objects (e.g., McNeil and Warrington, 1993;
Riddoch et al., 2008; Rivest et al., 2009; Rossion et al., 2011). The existence of such cases can be
used to suggest that a special system dedicated to faces that is not involved in object recognition
has been damaged. However, because human faces share the same basic features, it could also be
argued that faces are simply very “difficult objects” to recognize. Partial damage to the recognition
system might affect faces, but not objects if faces require an additional level of visual processing
relative to objects. This position is weakened, however, by the case of acquired object agnosic CK
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(Moscovitch et al., 1997) and the case of developmental agnosic
AW (Germine et al., 2011) who are able to identify faces despite
having significant difficulties in recognizing everyday objects.
Farah (1990, 1991, 2000) has claimed that recognition of
objects and faces typically rely on two distinct forms of
visual processing. In Farah’s exposition, objects typically require
decomposition into parts before they can be identified. For
example, identifying a chair might involve recognizing that it
has some legs, a flat surface on top of these legs and some sort
of back section. The ability to interpret and encode individual
parts will be referred to here as “featural processing.” Conversely,
Farah claimed that faces cannot be recognized by decomposition
into parts and are therefore recognized almost exclusively using
another system that sees the whole. The ability to combine
individual parts into a whole has been given various names by
different authors such as holistic, gestalt, or configural processing
(e.g., Calis et al., 1984; Diamond and Carey, 1986; Young et al.,
1987; Moscovitch et al., 1997; Barton, 2009; see Maurer et al.,
2002 for a review). In this paper, followingMaurer et al. (2002) we
will use holistic to refer to the ability to “glue” individual elements
of a face into a coherent whole and configural to refer to “first-
order relations that define faces (i.e., two eyes above a nose and
mouth)” (p. 255).
Can the dissociation between object agnosia and
prosopagnosia be explained solely in terms of the distinction
between featural and configural processing? There is strong
evidence that the agnosic patient CK (Moscovitch et al., 1997;
Moscovitch and Moscovitch, 2000) has preserved configural
processing despite impaired featural processing. CK could
recognize familiar faces whenever the configural information
appeared to be accessible from the visual stimulus. He therefore
performed well-when faces were presented as cartoons, as
caricatures, in disguise, and when a single internal feature
had been removed. He could also recognize famous faces
when all of the external features had been removed, and when
they were vertically misaligned. Crucially, however, CK was
severely impaired at recognizing inverted famous faces where
the configural information is hard to extract. He also performed
poorly on other facial recognition tasks in which the configural
information was reduced or absent such as recognition of
famous faces from their external features and recognition of
horizontally misaligned famous faces. Although normal controls
were inconvenienced by these manipulations, they all performed
very much better than CK. Presumably this is because their
object recognition system (unlike that of CK) is able to perform
some degree of compensatory feature-based processing on a face
when configural information cannot be accessed. On the basis
of CK’s preserved and impaired pattern of performance with
faces, Moscovitch et al. (1997, p. 592) concluded that the ability
to identify faces depends crucially on the “spatial relations of the
internal features of a face (the eyes, the nose, and the mouth) to
each other” and is quite separate from the ability to recognize
objects.
Important evidence concerning the existence of a configural
deficit in prosopagnosia has come from the study of patient
PS who has no low level visual processing impairments. PS
is able to distinguish Arcimboldo faces and Mooney faces
(Rossion et al., 2011) from non-facial stimuli accurately and
at normal speed. This finding suggests that she has preserved
ability to process faces holistically. However, PS is severely
impaired at matching upright unfamiliar faces (Busigny and
Rossion, 2010), but performs as accurately and quickly as
controls at matching inverted unfamiliar faces. This dissociation
suggests that she can use featural but not configural information
to distinguish one face from another. Further evidence of a
configural deficit is that PS shows no evidence of perceiving
facial features or facial composites more accurately when they
appear in the context of a whole face (Ramon et al., 2010)
than when they appear alone. This finding suggests that she
processes individual facial features independently of the overall
facial configuration. Another acquired prosopagnosic (GG) also
showed no face inversion effect, no face composite effect
and no part-whole advantage on unfamiliar face recognition
tasks, consistent with impaired configural but preserved featural
processing (Busigny et al., 2010). Barton et al. (2003) reported an
acquired prosopagnosic who could detect facial feature changes
but was relatively insensitive to manipulations that distorted
overall facial geometry of unfamiliar faces. Similar results have
also been reported by de Gelder and colleagues (e.g., Huis In ‘t
Veld et al., 2012) with individuals who have the developmental
variant of prosopagnosia.
Such studies provide convincing evidence that the problems
that prosopagnosic patients such as PS and GG experience in
processing unfamiliar faces are associated with a configural
processing deficit. Nevertheless, there is less evidence that
the core deficit in recognizing familiar faces in acquired
prosopagnosia is caused by a configural processing impairment.
It has never been demonstrated that prosopagnosic patients
perform well at identifying familiar faces when featural rather
than configural processing appears to be critical for recognition.
For example, PS was impaired relative to controls at recognizing
the inverted faces of the students that she taught (Busigny
and Rossion, 2010). Similar findings in another individual with
acquired prosopagnosia were reported by Rivest et al. (2009), who
performed much worse than controls at identifying familiar faces
even when they were inverted or fractured.
Such findings raise the possibility that the core deficit in
recognizing familiar faces in at least some forms of prosopagnosia
is at a deeper level than a purely configural processing deficit.
For example, Burton et al. (1991) and Burton and Young (1999)
argue that associative prosopagnosics have an impairment at
the level of face recognition units (FRUs). More precisely, they
claim that the appropriate FRU may be activated when a familiar
face is seen, but the connections between the FRU and stored
knowledge about the person are so weak that the face is not
overtly recognized. On the assumption that the same FRUs are
used to recognize familiar faces regardless of orientation, an
impairment of this kind should affect recognition of familiar
faces regardless of whether they are presented upright, inverted
or fractured. The view that the familiar face identification
impairment in prosopagnosia is caused by a configural processing
deficit would therefore be bolstered if a patient can be found
whose performance when recognizing familiar faces shows
preserved featural but impaired configural processing. Despite
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performing badly on tests with unfamiliar faces that require
configural processing, such a patient might perform well at
familiar face processing tasks such as inverted or fractured face
recognition. Below we report the case of an individual (DY) who
appears to fit this profile. As we will demonstrate, however, his
performance is different in some interesting respects from that
typically found in acquired prosopagnosia.
A total of nine studies are presented, two demonstrating the
specificity of DY’s prosopagnosia, four manipulating levels of
configural and featural processing of faces, one manipulating
global vs. local processing of non-face stimuli and two
investigating visual imagery for famous faces. Experiment 1
addresses DY’s ability to make within-category discriminations
for non-face visual objects, while Experiment 2 assesses his
performance on a visual recognition task of objects and famous
faces that have been matched for difficulty. Experiment 3 uses
the classic face inversion study to demonstrate the impact of
this paradigm on DY’s processing of unfamiliar faces while
Experiment 5 addresses the impact of inverting a small set of
famous faces that he sometimes recognizes. Experiments 4 and
6 use variants of paradigms devised by Moscovitch et al. to
pit featural and configural processing against one another using
familiar faces. Experiment 7 uses a classic cognitive paradigm
devised by Navon (1977) to investigate global and featural
processing in non-facial stimuli. This experiment provides
evidence that DY’s configural deficit is of a general kind and is not
confined to the processing of facial materials. Finally, Experiment
8 adapts the Young et al. (1994) approach to looking at mental
imagery for faces in the patient using a forced-choice recognition
task while Experiment 9 addresses this issue using a free recall
paradigm.
Case History
DY is a right-handed male sales executive born in 1946. After a
routine eye check in 1999, a left homonymous hemianopia was
revealed and a subsequent MRI scan identified a large arterio-
venous malformation (AVM) located in the right posterior
hemisphere. In 2000, DY was treated with embolization of the
AVM which involves obstruction of the AVM blood vessels with
a special glue. This was followed by gamma-knife surgery which
captured 90% of the malformation. This is a procedure for
treating tumors and AVMs using gamma radiation delivered to
a precise location by concentrating multiple beams from weaker
sources. In 2001, DY suffered a right occipital intracerebral
hemorrhage resulting from bleeding from the AVM. Figure 1
presents two T2-weighted fluid attenuated inversion recovery
(FLAIR) images taken 10 years later in 2011 illustrating DY’s
lesion. The MR signal from the CSF is suppressed and results
in the lesion being more prominent. DY’s lesion appears to be
confined to the posterior RH, but affecting parietal, temporal,
and a large part of the occipital lobe. Regions affected include
the precuneus, the cuneus, and lingual gyrus. Also affected are
middle temporal and fusiform gyri in the temporal lobe, and the
middle and inferior occipital gyri. The regions affected include
Brodmann areas 7, 17–19, and 37.
DY recovered in hospital and reported significant cognitive
difficulties, mostly memory problems and disorientation. DY
felt very distressed because he did not recognize his wife
or grandchildren when they came to visit him in hospital.
After leaving hospital, DY reported several cognitive difficulties.
Initially he experienced confusion in certain situations such as
looking at items in the fridge, and he found looking at the shelves
in supermarkets unbearable. DY described the experiences, in
his own words as “dyslexia of the eyes.” Most of these initial
difficulties resolved, but his ability to recognize faces has never
returned to normal. DY recalls an incident when shopping with
his wife, where they separated. Later, upon seeing him again
in the street, his wife walked toward him and waited to be
acknowledged; he did not recognize her and walked straight past.
He has now adopted techniques such as remembering his wife’s
clothes if they go out so that he can tell who she is when in
crowds. DY reports that he is often able to perform relatively well
in everyday life with his impairment because if he is expecting to
see somebody in a location he is more likely to recognize them
successfully by using memory of voices or clothing. In fact, using
his very strong visual memory skills, he is able to disguise an
extremely profound impairment.
During preliminary testing, analysis of DY’s verbal protocol
while naming faces suggested that the majority of his correct
recognitions were based on individual features found in faces
rather than a simple recognition of the face. During this phase
of testing, he named a picture of his neuropsychologist (and first
author, AJ) as the popstar George Michael. Whilst incorrect, this
showed that DY was using AJ’s goatee beard, slightly darker skin
and gold earring to arrive at the name of George Michael. Now
that DY associates the goatee beard with AJ, he has commented a
number of times that if AJ shaves off the goatee beard, he will no
longer be able to “recognize” him.
DY currently reports no noticeable difficulties with
recognizing objects but does have difficulty in finding his
way, and often has to ask for directions. There were no
indications of difficulties with reading or with color recognition.
There was no evidence of a loss of long term memory. The
studies reported were conducted over a period of 5 years
starting when DY was 60 years of age and in generally good
health.
Participants
DY’s performance was assessed relative to either published norms
or against a group of age and WTAR-IQ (Wechsler, 2001)
matched healthy male control participants. Due to the long time-
span of the studies reported, different sets of controls were used
for each study. Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2002) method for
comparing a single case with a group of control subjects was used
for statistical comparison of DY’s performance against that of the
controls.
Ethical Approval
All the studies described received approval from the University
of East London’s Ethics Committee.
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FIGURE 1 | Two axial T2 FLAIR MR images showing the location of
DY’s lesion (1× 1mm in-plane resolution, 3mm slice thickness; slice
locations relative to the nasion are as follows: (A) −35mm, (B)
−26mm). The lesion is confined mainly to the posterior regions of the right
hemisphere (predominantly occipital, but also including the precuneus), and
extending ventrally into temporal lobe regions.
Background Testing/Standard Cognitive
Functioning
Visuo-Spatial Processing
Visual Object and Space Perception Battery (VOSP;
Warrington and James, 1991)
DY was normal on five out of the eight subtests of the
VOSP (Table 1) and his main impairments were on the object
identification tasks of “silhouettes” and “progressive silhouettes.”
In these tests, only the outline forms of the objects are
visible. Poor performance on all of these tests suggests that
DY suffers from difficulties with recognition of the outlines of
shapes, termed, global forms. In object decision tasks when the
parts of the objects are available, performance is at a normal
level.
Birmingham Object Recognition Battery (BORB;
Riddoch and Humphreys, 1993)
On this extensive test of visuo-spatial abilities which addresses
different levels of visual processing, DY’s performance was
within the normal range on all tests apart from overlapping
figures and matching horizontal lines (Table 1). He was
able to recognize individual letters, geometric shapes, and
line drawings with no difficulty; however, when these
were overlapped with each other, DY’s performance time
in correctly naming the figures fell outside the normal
range.
Facial Expressions of Emotions: Stimuli and Tests
(FEEST; Young et al., 2002)
In this test of ability to process emotions from faces, a
series of faces showing six standard emotions are presented
on a computer screen with six verbal labels corresponding to
each emotion. Apart from particular problems in identifying
the “anger” emotion, DY’s performance was within one
standard deviation of the control mean and was often
superior.
Recognizing Mooney faces (Busigny et al., 2010)
Mooney faces are two-tone black and white pictures of faces that
do not contain clear facial features. It is difficult to see them as
faces when they are presented as inverted. This finding suggests
that holistic processing is required in order to identify Mooney
faces accurately.
The procedure developed by Busigny et al. (2010) was
used with DY. Busigny et al.’s procedure involved presentation
of 80 black and white Mooney faces selected from an
original set created by Schurger and colleagues (Art of Science
Competition, Princeton University, http://www.princeton.edu/
artofscience/gallery). The 80 stimuli were presented both
upright and upside-down randomly in two blocks of 80 trials.
Each stimulus was presented on a gray background and the
participant had to decide whether or not they saw a face by
pressing one of two keys on the computer keyboard; they
were informed that they should only use the “face” response
if they saw a face upright and that anything else should
be categorized as a non-face. Participants were instructed to
respond as accurately and as quickly as possible. Following
their response, a central fixation cross was presented for
300ms and then a gray screen for 300ms before the next
stimulus.
The results showed that DY was correct on 127/160 correct
which was significantly different from that of his matched
controls (M = 146.4, SD = 7.2), t(7) = 2.54, p = 0.019.
DY’s average response time per trial was 1317ms which was
also significantly different to that of the controls (M = 940ms;
SD = 117), t(7) = 3.04, p = 0.009. It therefore appears
that DY, has an impairment in holistic processing of unfamiliar
faces.
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TABLE 1 | Breakdown of DY’s performance on VOSP and BORB subtests.
Test Sub-test DY’s performance Interpretation
VOSP Incomplete letters 19/20 Normal
Silhouettes 14/30 Impaired
Object decision 16/20 Normal
Progressive silhouettes 11/20 Impaired
Dot counting 10/10 Normal
Position discrimination 15/20 Impaired
Number location 8/10 Normal
Cube analysis 10/10 Normal
BORB Copying simple shapes Accurate copying Normal
Length match (Horizontal) 20/30 Impaired
Length match (Vertical) 26/30 Normal
Size match 26/30 Normal
Orientation match 25/30 Normal
Gap match 37/40 Normal
Overlapping figures Paired letters (1.0:1.2) Normal
Triple letters (1.0:12) Impaired
Paired geometric
shapes (1.0:1.1)
Impaired
Triple geometric
shapes (1.0:1.2)
Impaired
Line Drawings
(1.0:1.4)
Impaired
Minimal feature match 25/25 Normal
Foreshortened view 25/25 Normal
Object decision 114/128 Normal
Benton Face-Matching Test (Benton and van Allen,
1968)
On the Benton Face-Matching Test, DY’s score of 41 placed
him just within normal limits. At face value, this result could
be interpreted as normal face perception. Indeed, De Renzi
and Pellegrino’s (1998) case Anna, similar to DY, did not
exhibit object agnosia and showed poor performance on a range
of face-perception tasks. De Renzi et al. (1991) took Anna’s
normal performance on the Benton test as implying intact
face perception. However, Duchaine and Nakayama (2004) have
shown that this test has poor specificity for picking up face
recognition difficulties. Further, Farah (1991) rightly cautions
against using just accuracy for interpreting performance on
this task since this can mask an abnormal strategy (an issue
that is very relevant to DY’s performance in Experiment 6 of
the current study—see later). As pointed out by Newcombe
(1979, p. 319) “Some prosopagnosic patients are reported to
match faces normally. . . Latencies, however, are not invariably
measured.” To address this issue, DY’s performance on the
test was timed and it was found that he took 12min to
complete the task. This is an extremely slow time and DY
(who tends to verbalize his thoughts when performing such
tasks) laboriously compared different features to arrive at
his seemingly “normal” accuracy score. The conclusion is
therefore that DY’s overall processing of the unfamiliar faces
on this task is abnormal. This suggests finds it difficult to use
FIGURE 2 | Within-category naming ability (error bars represent one
standard deviation).
configural information to distinguish one unfamiliar face from
another.
Experiment 1: Within-category Naming
In order to evaluate the specificity of DY’s visual recognition
abilities, his within-category naming was assessed.
Stimuli and Procedure
Participants were shown a series of 20 images of familiar
objects in each of four categories (national flags, types of car,
famous buildings, and football shirts) and were asked to name
each exemplar. All exemplars of flags, with a few exceptions,
conform to the same rectangular shape and therefore the
only way to name the country is by processing the specific
information within the flag. Similarly, cars tend to conform
to a prototypical shape but differ along dimensions such as
relative sizes of different parts, insignias, etc. The exemplars
of buildings were chosen so that there were visually similar
exemplars such as famous bridges. Finally given DY’s interest
in football, shirts belonging to teams in the English Premier
League were used; as in the case of flags, all football shirts
have the same shape and so identity of the particular football
club needs to be done by analysis of each exemplar’s colors and
insignias.
Participants
DY’s responses were compared to those of eight healthy male
controls matched for age (range 55–65 years, mean 60.9 years)
and education.
Results and Discussion
Figure 2 shows DY’s performance compared to that of the
controls and shows that he was within one standard deviation
or less of the control mean and therefore within normal limits
(all p > 0.05). This finding demonstrates that DY does not show
a within-category recognition deficit, implying that his naming
difficulties are restricted to faces.
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Experiment 2: Familiar Object and Face
Recognition
One criticism that can be leveled against using intact object
recognition in the context of face recognition difficulties to
suggest a specific impairment in the latter ability is that normal
controls are likely to perform near ceiling levels on both
recognition tasks involving faces and everyday objects (Farah,
1994). Judging a neuropsychological patient’s performance
as ‘intact’ relative to such ceiling effects therefore can be
questionable. To overcome this potential criticism, DY was
administered a naming test in which the difficulty of faces and
objects had been titrated to be of equal difficulty.
Stimuli and Procedure
The Essex-Exeter Matched Difficulty Object and Faces tests
(Lyons et al., 2002) test has been specifically created to include
sets of objects and faces that have been matched for naming
difficulty such that normal performance on neither test is at
ceiling levels. The test consists of four subsections, two for
faces and two for objects. Each of the subsections contains 31
items resulting in a total of 62 items being presented for each
category. Stimuli are presented on a computer screen for an
unlimited time with the participant having to provide the name
or sufficient semantic information to demonstrate recognition.
DY’s responses were compared to those of the mean and standard
deviation for the 50 participants in the original Lyons et al. (2002)
paper.
Results and Discussion
DY named 35/62 of the objects (M = 41.2, SD = 6.5) showing
that even when items have got quite specific names (e.g., puffin)
he performs within the control range, t(49) = 0.94, p > 0.05.
His responses were both accurate and fast. DY achieved a score
of 33/62 (M = 42.2, SD = 12.6) for face naming, which is
also within the normal range, t(49) = 0.72, p > 0.05. This
performance seems paradoxical for an individual who claims not
to be able to recognize his wife and other close family members.
However, as with his performance on the Benton test, it is
important to take account of the method that he used to achieve
such a level of performance. Unlike his rapid responses to objects,
DYs responses to faces were slow and faltering. Analysis of his
verbal protocol while naming faces suggested that the majority
of his correct responses were based on individual features found
in faces rather than a “normal” recognition of the face1. For
example, when shown an iconic picture of Marilyn Monroe, it
took DY 7 s to arrive at a name and then said that it was a
guess based on her beauty spot and the shape of her lips! Also,
rather than stating who the person was, he asks the question “Is
that Marilyn Monroe?” In sum, although sometimes DY is able
to recognize faces, his method of doing so is far from normal
and we believe that the apparently normal accuracy score for
naming faces masks a profound face recognition difficulty. In
Experiment 4, we will demonstrate formally this impairment by
1Two examples of DY’s face recognition problems are presented in the
Supplementary Material. DY was asked if he knew the name of the celebrity and
if he provided a name, to give a rating from 1 to 10 of his confidence.
measuring RT as well as accuracy when investigating DY’s ability
to recognize famous faces. Experiment 3 examines learning of
unfamiliar faces because featural cues to identity are much less
likely to be available to DY with unfamiliar than with famous
faces.
Experiment 3: Cambridge Face Memory
Test (Duchaine and Nakayama, 2006)
The Duchaine and Nakayama (2006) Cambridge Face Memory
Test provides an opportunity to investigate whether DY is
significantly impaired at learning new faces. It is designed
to explore recognition memory for unfamiliar faces in both
upright and inverted conditions. The standard finding from
normal controls is superior memory for faces when seen upright
compared to when seen inverted. This “face inversion effect” has
been used as a hallmark indication of the special nature of face
processing as under normal circumstances, faces are processed
as a configural whole. However, when faces are inverted, this
dedicated form of processing is disrupted, increasing the reliance
on featural processing. If DY’s normal accuracy for familiar faces
in Experiment 2 is associated with excellent featural processing
and impaired configural processing, it would follow that DY
should show a greatly reduced face inversion effect relative to
controls.
Stimuli and Procedure
Duchaine and Nakayama’s standard procedure was employed.
Briefly, participants are presented with black and white images of
unfamiliar faces to memorize. Immediately after a set of learning
trials for each face or set of faces, the participant is asked to select
the target from among an array that includes two distractors.
There are three stages increasing in difficulty with a different
number of stimuli for each section: Introductory (N = 18), Novel
(N = 30), Novel + Noise (N = 24). The test was completed by
DY and each normal control participant in an upright condition
followed by the inverted condition. (It should be noted that while
inverting a face could involve disruption of configural processing,
the CFMT also introduces an additional memory component
because there is a delay between initial learning of the to-be-
recognized upright face and the test trials with inverted faces.
Therefore, we acknowledge that there is a contamination of a
pure inversion effect as measured by the CFMT. However, since
many other research groups have used this measure, we do so
while acknowledging this caveat).
Participants
DY’s performance was compared to that of 10 normal controls
matched for age and WTAR IQ. The controls had a mean age of
59.2 (range 51–67) and mean IQ of 104.7 (range 92–115).
Results
Table 2 presents the performance of DY and the NCs as a
function of condition, broken down by sub-category within
condition. As expected, collapsing across the different conditions,
the NCs show a superiority for recognizing faces upright
compared to inverted, t(9) = 6.47, p < 0.001. Conversely, DY
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TABLE 2 | Performance on Cambridge Face Memory Test (standard
deviations in parentheses).
Condition DY NCs (N = 10)
Upright Introductory (max = 18) 12 17.7 (0.5)
Novel (max = 30) 7 17.6 (4.1)
Novel + Noise (max = 24) 7 11.6 (3.5)
Inverted Introductory (max = 18) 11 12.9 (4.2)
Novel (max = 30) 14 12.9 (2.0)
Novel + Noise (max = 24) 6 9.4 (2.5)
performs at least as well on the inverted faces as on the upright
faces. Overall, DY was significantly impaired relative to controls
in the upright condition, t(9) = 3.18, p = 0.01, but within
normal limits for the inverted condition, t(9) = 0.74, p = 0.48.
Lookingmore closely at the sub-categories, there was a significant
difference between DY and the normal controls in the upright
introductory, t(9) = 11.32, p < 0.001 and novel sub-categories,
t(9) = 2.49, p < 0.05. Contrasting with the upright condition, DY
was always within normal limits in the inverted condition (all p >
0.05). There was no significant difference between DY and the
controls in the most difficult sub-category of both conditions but
as can be seen, his performance in both cases was below chance.
Only in the condition where noise is added (a manipulation that
disrupts local/feature processing more than global processing)
did DY show any evidence of poor performance.
Directly comparing the difference between the upright and
inverted conditions, using Crawford and Garthwaite’s (2005)
Revised Standardized Difference Test (RSDT), it was found that
DY was significantly different to NCs, t(9) = 10.45, p = 0.00004.
Discussion
DY’s poor performance in the upright condition clearly
reveals a significant impairment in learning new upright faces.
Interestingly, DY showed no significant impairment relative to
controls in the inverted faces condition consistent with the
view that his featural processing of faces is normal. The results
strongly suggest that he is relying on featural rather than
configural information to identify previously unfamiliar faces.
As expected, the normal controls display the expected upright
superiority effect achieving higher scores in the upright condition
than the inverted condition. However, DY did not show the
upright superiority effect and in fact performed slightly better
in the inverted condition than the upright condition (Table 2).
The finding that prosopagnosics perform at least as well on
inverted as upright faces has been termed the “inverted inversion
effect” (Farah et al., 1995) and is even found in some cases of
developmental prosopagnosia (Duchaine et al., 2006; Le Grand
et al., 2006; Bate et al., 2008).
The absence of an inversion effect for DY must be treated
with some caution, however. First, the performances of DY and
controls were near floor in some of the inverted conditions.
Second, because of the structure of the CFMT, it is not possible to
counterbalance half sets of the upright and inverted conditions.
Since our primary aim was to objectively demonstrate DY’s
difficulty in remembering pre-experimentally unfamiliar faces,
we conducted the upright condition first and followed this with
the inverted condition in order to test for the inversion effect. So
one explanation for the lack of inversion effect in DY is that it may
have come about because the inverted faces were presented after
the faces had already been presented in the upright condition.
Experiment 4: “Face-fracturing” Test
In this experiment, we investigated the time that it takes for
DY to recognize a famous face. It seems highly likely that his
recognition strategy will lead to extremely long RTs even if it
sometimes produces accurate performance. We tried to ensure
fairly accurate performance by using a set of faces that DY was
able to identify consistently. The stimuli were generated by asking
DY’s wife to provide a list of names of famous people who, she felt
DY recognized on a consistent basis when they appeared on TV
or in the newspapers. It was stressed that this recognition should
be based on visual attributes rather than their names, voices or
any semantic information. Using a variety of sources, 25 easily
recognizable photos were compiled for the set of stimuli. The
critical dependent variable was the speed with which these faces
could be identified by DY.
A second goal of the experiment was to investigate DY’s ability
to recognize fractured faces. Moscovitch et al. (1997) showed
that their object agnosic patient CK had impaired recognition of
faces that were created by taking intact photographs and cutting
them into five or six parts. Individual features (eyes, noses, etc.)
were kept intact and the first-order relations between the features
were kept intact (e.g., the eyes were kept above the nose which
was kept above the mouth, etc.). Moscovitch et al. found that
whilst CK’s performance was completely normal in the intact
condition, his performance fell six standard deviations below
the mean of the controls when the same faces were “fractured.”
Since exactly the same visual information was available in both
conditions, these data strongly suggest that the manipulation of
isolating features spatially by destroying the gestalt impaired CK’s
recognition ability. In Experiment 4, Moscovitch et al.’s paradigm
was adopted for use with DY.
Stimuli
Photos that DY’s wife thought he would recognize were compiled
for the ‘intact’ set of stimuli. It was stipulated that all the faces
had to be of individuals who had come to public prominence
before 1999 when DY was first diagnosed with brain damage.
Then using image-manipulation software (Corel Draw), each of
these color photos was digitally cut using the criteria suggested
by Moscovitch et al. (1997). Figure 3 gives an example of the face
of Bob Geldof in the two conditions. In total 25 faces were used.
Participants
DY’s performance was compared to a group of six male control
participants who also participated in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Each list of intact and fractured faces was divided into two equal
sets to allow counter-balancing of conditions. Half of the intact
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FIGURE 3 | Examples of an Intact and Fractured face (Bob Geldof).
set and half of the fractured set were used on Day 1 of testing
and then the remainder were used on Day 2 of testing which took
place a week later. Stimuli were presented individually on a laptop
using E-prime software and the participant was asked to name
as quickly as possible the individual in the display. This allowed
accuracy and response times for correctly named stimuli to be
measured.
Results
In terms of naming accuracy, controls named 24/25 of the
intact faces (SD = 0.63) and 23.17/25 of the fractured faces
(SD = 1.17). DY performed very similarly to the controls naming
23 faces in the intact condition, t(5) = 1.46, p > 0.05, and
22 in the fractured condition, t(5) = 0.93, p > 0.05. DY’s
accurate performance for intact faces is expected given that the
stimulus set was created by asking his wife for faces that he
consistently recognizes; however, it is striking that fracturing has
no significant impact on his overall accuracy. By contrast, CK
(Moscovitch et al., 1997) was severely impaired by a fracturing
manipulation.
To investigate performance further, the average times for
correct responses were compared (see Figure 4). As can be seen,
the normal pattern of performance is that the fractured condition
takes longer, almost double that of the intact condition. However,
DY shows the opposite pattern with his average time in the
fractured condition being only 2 s slower than that of the controls
whereas his average time for the intact condition was on average
10 s slower. Directly comparing the difference between RTs in
the intact and fractured conditions (Crawford and Garthwaite,
2005), revealed that DY was significantly different from NCs
[t(5) = 10.66, p = 0.00013].
Discussion
The results demonstrated that DY takes a relatively long time
to identify familiar faces despite his accurate performance. They
also revealed that face fracturing has no impact on his familiar
face identification accuracy. Furthermore, the time that DY
took to arrive at an answer was in fact faster in the fractured
condition, and, anecdotally, he reported that he found this
condition easier. Overall, DY’s performance implies reliance on
featural processing irrespective of whether the face is presented
intact or fractured. It may well be that he performs more quickly
in the fractured face condition because his impaired configural
processing skills interfere with face recognition in the standard
FIGURE 4 | Mean response times for DY and matched controls (NCs)
on the Moscovitch et al. (1997) face-fracturing paradigm.
condition (cf. Farah et al., 1995; Boutsen and Humphreys, 2002).
The finding that his performance was faster in the fractured
condition is consistent at some levels with the evidence of
inversion superiority in Experiment 3. As suggested by Farah
et al. (1995, p. 2093), this “concept of dominance by a specialized
but impaired brain system” has been invoked to explain the
discrepancy found in other areas of neuropsychology such as
linguistic performance following left-hemisphere brain damage.
There may be no interference in the fractured condition because
such stimuli do not activate DY’s impaired configural processing
system.
Experiment 5: Inverted Famous Faces
The results of Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that DY’s problems
in identifying faces are associated with a deficit in configural
processing despite normal featural processing. Experiment 5
investigated his ability to identify inverted pre-morbidly familiar
faces. If he uses featural rather than configural information, it
would be predicted that he would show no effect of inversion on
accuracy of naming or on the time necessary to recognize a face
as being familiar.
Stimuli and Procedure
In the first phase of this experiment, the faces from Experiment
4 were used again. They were inverted and presented on a
laptop computer. There was no time limit. Following Moscovitch
and Moscovitch (2000), an answer was deemed correct if the
name was provided or if sufficient semantic information to
demonstrate recognition was produced. At least a week separated
the presentation of the upright and inverted faces. In the second
phase of the experiment, which took place several months later,
new inverted pictures of the 25 faces used in Experiment 4
were presented. We used new pictures of the celebrities to avoid
any possible priming from having seen the images used in
Experiment 4. Participants had to respond with a key press as
to whether or not they recognized the inverted face as familiar,
a procedure that allowed RT for recognition to be measured.
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Participants
DY’s performance was compared to that of nine normal controls
matched for age and WTAR IQ. The controls had a mean age of
63.1 years (range 59–69) and mean IQ of 112 (range 90–117).
Results
Table 3 shows performance of DY and the matched controls for
recognition in the inverted and upright conditions. DY’s Phase
1 upright accuracy scores come from Experiment 4. There was
no significant difference between DY and the control participants
in the inverted condition, t(8) = 0.76, p > 0.05, with his
performance falling within one standard deviation of the control
mean. The accuracy with which inverted faces were recognized
in Phase 2 was also within the normal range, as was the length of
time required to make these identification decisions.
Discussion
When faces that DY can recognize are inverted, his recognition
is within normal limits in terms of both speed and accuracy. It
is also interesting to note that, like the normal controls, DY’s
performance was much better in the upright than in the inverted
condition. A strong version of a theory that suggests that DY
only has access to featural processing might predict that his
performance should be the same upright and inverted since he
would be basing his recognition on a simple featural match.
One possibility, therefore, is that the recognition of individual
facial features is, to at least some extent, orientation specific
(Moscovitch and Moscovitch, 2000). If so, inversion will make
not only configural processing but also featural processing of
faces more difficult. Consistent with such an account, a number
of experiments have shown that inversion disrupts face feature
perception in matching tasks (e.g., Yovel and Kanwisher, 2004;
Yovel and Duchaine, 2006). If it is assumed that face fracturing
does not interfere with featural processing to the same degree as
inversion, then this would explain why performance was much
better for fractured faces in Experiment 4 than for inverted faces
in the current experiment.
Experiment 6: External Features
Moscovitch and Moscovitch (2000) argued that if their patient
CK’s object agnosia was driven by reliance on a face-processing
system that is based on configural processing as a result of
damage to the part-based system, he would suffer if the main
configural information is removed from a face. To explore this,
TABLE 3 | Identification of upright and inverted famous faces (max = 25;
standard deviations in parentheses).
DY NCs (N = 9)
PHASE 1
Upright 23 24.6 (1.14)
Inverted 9 12.4 (7.78)
PHASE 2
Inverted accuracy 10 13.1 (5.0)
Inverted RT (ms) 3586 3120 (1054)
they created stimuli in which themain configuration of eyes, nose
and mouth were cut and were replaced by a white space. They
found that whereas healthy controls were somewhat impaired
by this manipulation (with recognition dropping to 63.8% of
that with the faces whole), CK was grossly impaired with his
performance dropping to 33.3%. Experiment 6 was conducted to
investigate DY’s recognition of familiar faces using only external
features.
Stimuli and Procedure
A corpus of 42 famous faces was assembled. Some of these were
of faces that DY is known to recognize and had been used in
Experiments 4 and 5; however, care was taken to make sure that
the same photograph was not used for the current study and
instead new photographs were found. The remaining faces were
of famous individuals who are often recognized from their very
particular hairstyles or other features outside the face. Following,
Moscovitch andMoscovitch’s (2000) procedure, a line was drawn
just above the eyes and the edges of this were joined to points
just either side of the mouth and finally these two points were
brought together just underneath the mouth. The space created
by these five lines was filled in with white space (see Figure 5).
All participants were presented the stimuli in the same order
on a laptop computer. There was no time limit and, again, an
answer was deemed correct if the name was provided or sufficient
semantic information to demonstrate recognition was produced.
Participants
DY’s performance was compared to that of the nine controls who
took part in Experiment 5.
Results
DY identified 31/42 of the faces correctly compared to the mean
of the controls which was 32.1 (SD = 6.37). There was no
significant difference between these scores, t(8) = 0.17, n.s.
Discussion
DY’s unimpaired performance on this test shows that he is able
to recognize familiar faces from their external features. This
finding represents a dissociation with patient CK (Moscovitch
FIGURE 5 | Example of a stimulus from Experiment 6 with the internal
features of Elvis Presley’s face digitally removed.
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and Moscovitch, 2000) whose performance on this task was
severely impaired. It provides further evidence that DY’s familiar
face recognition impairment is characterized by normal featural
processing but impaired configural processing.
Experiment 7: Navon Figures
In a landmark study, Navon (1977) investigated the relationship
between processing at the “global” level looking at the whole,
and processing at the more local level looking at the specific
elements of this whole. Using arrays of stimuli where the target
(e.g., a large H) was made up of many constituent elements (e.g.,
small squares or other letters) he found that the “global pattern
is apprehended but not its components. All but three subjects
did not even notice that the stimuli were made of small letters”
(Navon, 1977, p. 368). In his third experiment, he looked at the
effect of directing attention either to the global figure (e.g., the
large H) or its constituent elements.
Inferences were made from differences in response times
when the letters were conflicting (e.g., large H composed of small
Ss) and when the letters were consistent (e.g., large H composed
of small Hs). Navon found that participants were quicker to
recognize global letters than constituent local elements. More
importantly, they were also significantly impaired in recognizing
local letters when they conflicted with the global letter (e.g., a
large S composed of smaller Hs), but not in recognizing global
letters when the images conflicted. Navon proposed that global
configural aspects of an image are perceived before the local parts.
This finding, which has been replicated many times, (see Kimchi,
1992 for a review) has been termed the “global precedence
hypothesis.” Darling et al. (2009) found that normal participants
who were the most susceptible to global interference when
recognizing local letters on the Navon task performed better on a
test of unfamiliar face identification. Martin and Macrae (2010)
reported that individuals who show weak global interference
show a reduced face inversion effect on a test of face recognition.
There is therefore evidence that global processing in a Navon-
style paradigm corresponds with configural processing and
local processing corresponds with featural processing. Moreover,
individuals with developmental prosopagnosia have been shown
to have local rather than global preference (Behrmann et al.,
2005) on this task. Consequently, it would be predicted that if
DY has an impairment in configural processing, he should not
show the global precedence effect. However, this remains an
open question because Busigny et al. (2010) and Busigny and
Rossion (2011) found that two different patients with acquired
prosopagnosia both showed the standard global precedence effect
on the Navon task.
Experiment 7 investigated the Navon effect in DY and
matched controls; the latter were expected to show quicker
responses in the global attention condition than in the local
attention condition. The critical issues were whether DY would
be slower in the global level attention condition than the
local level attention condition, and whether there would be
any significant difference in DY’s responses at the global level
(as in normal performance) in the conflicting and consistent
conditions. At the local level, controls should perform more
slowly in the conflicting conditions. Would, however, DY show
any significant difference between response times made in the
conflicting and consistent conditions?
Stimuli
Four Navon-type letter images were created. These consisted
of large figures of H and S composed of either smaller Hs or
Ss, resulting in four possible images, two consistent and two
conflicting (see Figure 6). The large letters were created on a
template using Arial font, point size 300. The smaller letters were
created using Arial font, point size 24.
Participants
DY and nine normal controls from Experiment 3 took part in this
experiment.
Procedure
The test involved a fixation point presented for 2 s, followed by
the letter image being presented on a computer screen for 100ms
using E-prime software. The image was then followed by a mask
which was a simple array of dots that covered the same visual
angle as the experimental stimuli. The participants’ task was to
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to whether the
image attended to was an H or S by pressing the H or S keys
on the keyboard. The mask remained until a response was made.
Each of the stimuli were presented 20 times, with a total of 80
trials; 40 of the trials were classified as “consistent” (i.e., H made
of Hs and Smade of Ss) and the remaining 40 trials were classified
as “conflicting” (i.e., H made of Ss and S made of Hs). DY and
controls carried out the test in two conditions. The first condition
was to respond to the identity of the “global” letter and the second
condition was to respond to the identity of the “local” letter.
Accuracy and response times were recorded. Before the tests in
both conditions, a series of practice items were presented using
combinations of the letters L and B until the participant felt
comfortable enough to proceed with the test.
Results
In terms of accuracy, DY made 6.25% errors; one control made
23.75% errors while the error rate for the remainder ranged
between 0 and 7.5% so this control was omitted from further
analysis. Response times for correct responses were analyzed, and
outliers that were more than 2 SDs above the mean were removed
for each participant.
DY’s response times were found to be in the normal range
in both local conditions [consistent: 513ms, t(7) = 1.03, ns;
FIGURE 6 | Examples of Navon figures in two conditions, consistent
(where the large figure is the same as its constituent elements) and
Inconsistent (where the large figure is made up of another letter).
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FIGURE 7 | Mean response times on the Navon task for DY and normal
controls (NCs) as a function of consistency level (consistent vs.
conflicting) and attention (global vs. local) (error bars represent 1
standard deviation).
conflicting: 547ms, t(7) = 0.38, ns] (see Figure 7). However,
in the global task he was significantly slower in the consistent
condition [591ms, t(7) = 3.77, p = 0.007] while the difference in
reaction times to that of the controls in the conflicting condition
approached significance [627ms, t(7) = 2.01, p = 0.08].
The normal controls showed a classic interference effect in
the local condition with the responses to the consistent letters
being faster than those to the conflicting ones (local consistent
M = 445ms, SD = 62; local conflictingM = 517ms, SD = 73),
t(7) = 3.86, p = 0.0062. A similar interference was found in the
global condition (global consistent M = 413, SD = 44; global
conflicting M = 460, SD = 79), t(7) = 3.20, p = 0.015. Unlike
the controls, DY was not susceptible to the interference effect in
either the local condition, t(69) = 1.39, p = 0.17, or the global
condition, t(69) = 1.01, p = 0.31.
Finally, the global and local conditions were compared to one
another. For the normal controls, the global condition was faster
and this difference approached significance [GlobalM = 430ms,
Local M = 480; t(7) = 2.11, p = 0.073]. DY, on the other
hand was significantly faster in the local condition (Global M =
609ms, LocalM = 530), t(139) = 3.76, p < 0.001.
Discussion
As expected, the results from the healthy controls replicated the
classic Navon effect, i.e., that perception of the whole precedes
that of constituent elements of an image. This is demonstrated
starkly in the significant slowing down when the task is to
name the constituent element when its identity conflicts with
that of the global form. This happened for both the global
and local conditions of the task and while Navon did not
find this in his original study, the same has been found by
Behrmann et al. (2005); Busigny et al. (2010) and Busigny
and Rossion (2011). However, DY’s response is quite abnormal
and somewhat different from that of the patients studied by
Busigny and colleagues. In the local task, his reaction times were
comfortably within normal limits but unlike controls, he showed
no interference effect. His perception of the whole is grossly
abnormal however, with his reaction times being slower than
that of controls in both consistent and conflicting conditions.
Further, he derives no advantage when the global form matches
the local elements and showed no interference effect. Finally,
unlike Busigny and Rossion’s (2011) patient PS, and similar to
Busigny et al.’s (2010) patient GG, DY was significantly faster
in the local task. This finding is consistent with intact featural
processing paired with impaired global processing.
Experiment 8: Mental Imagery for Famous
Faces
Young et al. (1994) conducted a series of studies on
prosopagnosic patients HJA and PH to investigate the links
between visual recognition and mental imagery for faces.
The results showed that it was possible for an apperceptive
prosopagnosic patient such as HJA to have a profound face
recognition difficulty and yet perform very well on tasks
requiring him to make judgements requiring imagery for faces
that he did not recognize. Experiments 8 and 9 were constructed
to investigate the integrity of DY’s mental imagery for faces.
Stimuli
Following Young et al.’s (1994) procedure, four sets of 20 different
people who had become famous before the onset of DY’s face
recognition difficulties (2001) were created. In each set, 10 had a
particular feature and 10 did not. The features used were baldness
(i.e., 10 people known for being balding or with shaved heads
such as the actor Telly Savalas and 10 hirsute people), facial hair
(10 people known for usually having mustaches or beards and 10
who were not), fair hair (10 people with fair hair and 10 with dark
hair), and glasses (10 people known to usually wear spectacles and
10 who did not). Within each set, the order of the 20 names was
pseudo-randomized.
Participants
DY’s performance was compared to that of eight normal controls
matched for age and WTAR IQ. The controls had a mean age of
61.0 years (range 58–65) and mean IQ of 112 (range 101–117).
Procedure
Each name within a set was presented individually and the
participant was asked to imagine the person’s face and answer
the question relevant to that set, i.e., balding vs. not balding,
facial hair vs. no facial hair, fair vs. dark hair and glasses or no
glasses. Examples from each set include: balding vs. not balding,
Telly Savalas (correct answer “yes”), Elvis Presley (correct answer
“no”); facial hair vs. no facial hair, GrouchoMarx (correct answer
“yes”), Cliff Richard (correct answer “no”); fair vs. dark hair, Meg
Ryan (correct answer “yes”), Jimi Hendrix (correct answer “no”);
glasses vs. no glasses, Buddy Holly (correct answer “yes”), Paul
McCartney (correct answer “no”).
Results
Overall, DY achieved 85% accuracy across all four categories
and this matched the average of the control participants which
was also 85%. From Figure 8 it can be seen that across the four
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FIGURE 8 | Mean number correct on the mental imagery task for DY
and normal controls (NCs) as a function of stimulus condition (error
bars represent 1 standard deviation).
categories, DY’s performance was at themean level of the controls
or was within one standard deviation. As a result, no further
analysis was conducted.
Experiment 9: Mental Imagery Free Recall
Experiment 8 involved a simple “yes/no” decision and DY’s
performance seemed perfectly intact. However, it could be argued
that good performance on this task is driven by propositional
knowledge of different attributes of individuals’ faces and that
this is not a convincing demonstration of the intactness of
DY’s internal representations of faces. Therefore, Experiment 9
examined DY’s mental representations by conducting a free recall
mental imagery task in which he was asked to describe in his own
words what a number of people looked like.
Stimuli and Procedure
The names of 10 famous personalities were read out to
participants one at a time. They were asked to describe the
person’s face to their best of their ability and to avoid semantic
attributes, i.e., to base the descriptions purely on visual features.
The protocols of the descriptions were transcribed and the
resulting transcripts had any remaining non-visual semantic
information removed. The 10 verbal descriptions produced by
each participant were then given to a set of six raters along
with the 10 target names. The raters were simply asked to
match the descriptions to the names. From this procedure, the
dependent variable for each experimental participant was the
average number of their descriptions that were correctly matched
to target names by the raters.
Participants
DY’s performance was compared to that of eight normal controls
matched for age and WTAR IQ. The controls had a mean age of
61.2 (range 51–69) and mean IQ of 107.4 (range 90–117).
Results
Across the six raters, DY’s verbal descriptions scored 8/10 which
was well-within the range of the normal controls (M = 8.4,
SD = 1.16), t(7) = 0.33, p > 0.05.
Discussion of Experiments 8 and 9
The results from Experiments 8 and 9 show that, despite DY
having profound problems in recognizing faces, he nonetheless
is able to make very good judgments and provide recognizable
descriptions from his internal mental images of famous people’s
faces. His performance (in Experiment 8) is similar to that of
the apperceptive prosopagnosic patient HJA who also performed
normally on facial imagery tasks for faces that he could not
recognize. The mental imagery studies strongly imply that
DY’s internal representations of the faces of famous people
are largely intact. We conclude that his face recognition units
are preserved and can be accessed from familiar names and
from the semantic system (see Craigie and Hanley, 1993,
1997, for discussion of how this form of retrieval appears to
take place).
General Discussion
In this study, we have presented data from a patient who,
in the context of relatively unimpaired naming of familiar
objects, complains of profound face recognition difficulties.
His impairment with once familiar faces is so severe that, in
everyday life, he is unable to recognize even close members
of his family such as his wife, children, or grandchildren.
Table 4 presents a summary of DY’s performance as standardized
scores relative to controls on the main background tests
and the nine experimental studies. Table 4 also indicates
the type of processing that was under investigation in each
experiment.
Consistent with his reported problems, DY performed much
worse than controls at learning new upright faces (Experiment
3). Paradoxically, he identified famous faces more accurately
than might have been expected (Experiment 2) and his accuracy
in unfamiliar face-matching tasks (e.g., Benton and van Allen,
1968) put him within the “normal” range. However, closer
inspection of his performance revealed that his higher-than-
expected accuracy was based almost entirely on identification
of particular features within faces. Mistaking a photo of one
of the researchers for George Michael because the former
has a goatee beard provided an example of how reliant he is
on recognition of individual features. This featural strategy
revealed itself clearly when he took much longer to identify
upright famous faces (Experiment 4) than controls. Similarly
the time that he took to complete the Benton unfamiliar face-
matching test was grossly abnormal, and his verbal protocols
clearly revealed a laborious feature-by-feature matching
strategy.
The results of subsequent experiments provided further
evidence of DY’s reliance on featural processing. He produced
normal or relatively preserved performance on tests of
familiar face recognition that depend on processing of
featural information such as recognition of fractured familiar
faces (Experiment 4), recognition of inverted familiar faces
(Experiment 5), and recognition of famous faces from their
external features (Experiment 6).
In none of these tasks is configural information readily
available from faces, andDY appears to be relatively unaffected by
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TABLE 4 | Summary of DY’s performance on background and experimental tests relative to controls with z-scores where possible (numbers in brackets
denote experiment numbers).
Test/Expt Sub-test/Cond Measure Testing DY NCx˙ NCsd z-score Interpretation
Mooney faces Acc (max = 160) Holistic processing 127 146.4 7.2 2.69 Impaired
RT ” 1317 940 117 3.21 Impaired
BFMT Acc Face Perception 41 Normal
RT Impaired
Within-category (1) Flags Acc (max = 20) Object naming 11 14.25 2.9 1.1 Normal
Cars ” ” 10 13.25 4.7 0.7 Normal
Football shirts ” ” 14 15.12 2.40 0.47 Normal
Buildings ” ” 15 15.3 3.08 0.10 Normal
Essex-Exeter (2) Object and Face naming 35 41.2 6.50 0.95 Normal
CFMT (3) Upright Acc (max = 72) Configural processing 26 46.9 6.26 3.34 Impaired
Inverted Acc (max = 72) Featural processing 31 35.2 5.43 0.77 Normal
Inversion effect Configural processing -0.088 0.1431 0.01 33.1 Impaired
Face fracturing (4) Intact Acc (max = 25) Featural processing 23 24 0.63 1.58 Normal
Fractured ” ” 22 23.17 1.17 1.00 Normal
Intact RT Featural processing 11,551 2574 327 −27.4 Impaired
Fractured ” ” 7585 5214 600 −3.95 Impaired
Inverted famous faces (5) Acc (max = 25) Featural processing 10 13.1 5.00 0.62 Normal
RT ” 3586 3120 1054 −0.44 Normal
External features of faces (6) Acc (max = 42) Featural processing 31 32.1 6.37 0.17 Normal
Navon task (7) RT Configural processing Impaired
Mental imagery (8) Bald Acc (max = 20) Face Recognition Units 16 17.4 0.88 1.64 Normal
Glasses ” ” 16 16.6 3.40 0.16 Normal
Fair hair ” ” 18 15.8 3.23 −0.69 Normal
Facial hair ” ” 18 17 3.16 −0.32 Normal
FR mental imagery (9) Acc (max = 10) Face Recognition Units 8 8.4 1.16 0.34 Normal
NCx˙ , Normal Control (NC) mean; NCsd , NC standard deviation; BFMT, Benton Face Matching Task; Essex-Exeter, Essex Exeter Matched Difficulty Task; CFMT, Cambridge Face Memory
Task; RT, mean response time (ms); Acc, Accuracy; FR, Free Recall.
its absence. DY’s performance in these four experiments, together
with his unimpaired ability to name objects, represents a double
dissociationwith the object agnosic patient CK (Moscovitch et al.,
1997; Moscovitch and Moscovitch, 2000) who performed badly
at object recognition and on face recognition tasks that require
featural processing despite excellent recognition of faces when
configural information is available.
When configural information must be used to achieve normal
levels of performance, as in the time required to recognize
upright famous faces, DY performed much worse than controls
(Experiment 4). Consistent with a holistic processing deficit,
DY performed poorly on the Mooney faces. Consistent with a
more general global processing deficit, DY performed differently
from controls in Experiment 7 where he showed evidence of
impaired processing of the global form of the Navon Figures.
In line with the views of Farah and Moscovitch, therefore,
the performance of DY provides strong evidence of a patient
with prosopagnosia whose problems in recognizing familiar
faces is the consequence of a holistic/configural processing
deficit.
Nevertheless, DY’s accurate recognition of upright familiar
faces (Experiment 2) raises an important question. Why is he
able to identify so many famous faces via a featural processing
strategy when the performance of many prosopagnosics on
such tasks is either at chance or is severely impaired? Is this
because DY has unusually good featural processing skills? Some
prosopagnosics such as HJA and MS (Newcombe et al., 1989)
do suffer from object recognition deficits as well as from face
recognition deficits. So, their total inability to identify any
familiar faces probably does reflect severe featural as well as
configural processing impairments.
However, the situation is different with other prosopagnosic
patients whose accuracy at familiar face recognition is severely
impaired such as LH (Levine and Calvanio, 1989; Farah
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et al., 1995), FB (Riddoch et al., 2008), and WJ (McNeil and
Warrington, 1993), All three cases appear to have preserved
featural processing: LH was able to recognize difficult objects
well and performed well at matching inverted unfamiliar faces;
FB showed excellent ability to name familiar objects and to
learn names for greebles (complex novel shapes); WJ showed
excellent ability to identify sheep facesIt therefore seems unlikely
that the featural skills of DY are markedly superior to those
of all three of these patients. So why are they much less
accurate than DY at familiar face identification? One possible
explanation is that familiar face identification problems in these
three patients reflect a more associative form of prosopagnosia
than that experienced by DY. In these three individuals, there
may be an impairment either to the face recognition units
themselves or to the connections between the face recognition
units and the rest of the cognitive system (Burton and Young,
1999). A problem of this kind would impair identification
of familiar faces even if featural processing was entirely
preserved.
It is also interesting to note that DY’s ability to identify
inverted and fractured familiar faces makes a striking contrast
with the performance of patient DC, reported by Rivest et al.
(2009). Like DY, DC had excellent object recognition skills,
consistent with preserved featural processing despite problems
in identifying familiar faces and matching unfamiliar faces.
Unlike DY, however DC, was impaired relative to controls at
identifying fractured and inverted familiar faces. For example,
DC recognized only 9.1% of inverted pictures of famous faces that
he could identify when presented upright. The corresponding
figure for controls was 52%. Rivest et al. concluded that the parts-
based system cannot by itself identify familiar faces and that
the configural processing system must interact with the featural
system to recognize fractured and inverted faces. A configural
processing deficit, they argue, will invariably lead to a problem
in identifying inverted faces. They therefore predict that it should
not be possible to observe a prosopagnosic patient who provides
a double dissociation with the object agnosic CK by performing
well at object recognition and at the recognition of inverted and
fractured faces. As we suggested earlier, however, DY appears to
represent exactly such a case. It is therefore worth considering
instead whether an impairment at the level of the face recognition
units (Burton and Young, 1999) might be able to explain DC’s
poor performance when recognizing familiar faces. Because a
face recognition unit impairment would affect face processing at
a point at which featural and configural processing have already
been completed, it would disrupt identification of familiar faces
regardless of whether they were upright, inverted or fractured.
This is precisely the pattern of performance that Rivest et al.
observed in DC.
In conclusion, although there is considerable evidence that
prosopagnosics’ impaired configural processing interferes with
their processing of unfamiliar faces (e.g., Rossion et al., 2011),
there is much less evidence that a configural processing
deficit is the cause of impaired identification of familiar faces
in prosopagnosia. Indeed, it appears that the familiar face
processing problems experienced by prosopagnosic patients such
as DC (Rivest et al., 2009), LH (Levine and Calvanio, 1989;
Farah et al., 1995), FB (Riddoch et al., 2008), and WJ (McNeil
and Warrington, 1993) can be readily explained in terms of
a problem at the level of the face recognition units (Burton
and Young, 1999). In cases of apperceptive prosopagnosia such
as HJA or ME (Young et al., 1994), there is evidence of
impaired featural as well as impaired configural processing. The
case of DY is therefore unusual in that he has no problem
in recognizing objects (consistent with unimpaired featural
processing). Neither does he have a problem in identifying
inverted or fractured familiar faces or in accessing mental images
of familiar faces (consistent with unimpaired face recognition
units). He therefore presents the clearest case yet reported
of an acquired prosopagnosic whose impaired processing of
familiar faces appears to be the consequence of a configural
processing deficit.
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